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A  lack  of  awareness  and  understanding  of  risk  and  uncertainty  can  lead  to  poor 
decision making and higher costs for policy providers, as not accounting for them 
may produce policy which is inflexible and with a negative effect on welfare. Further, 
misunderstanding  of  and/or  failure  to  account  for  risk  and  uncertainty  can  inhibit 
research  and  development  for  policy  to  which  environmental  economics  can 
contribute (for example, in developing effective measures of sustainability).  The aim 
of  this  project  is  to  develop  guidelines  for  ‘Best  Practice’  approaches  to  risk  and 
uncertainty  in  environmental  economics  for  guiding  policy  development  and 
implementation,  taking  into  account  key  issues  such  as  costs,  irreversibility, 
adaptation  and  dynamics.  These  guidelines  are  developed  by  examining  the 
frameworks commonly used by environmental economists to account for risk and 
uncertainty (such as the Precautionary Principle and Cost Benefit Analysis) as well 
as specifically developed theories (e.g. Quiggin’s Rank Dependent Utility Theory), 
borrowing  from  other  disciplines  (e.g.  Prospect  Theory)  and  drawing  attention  to 
lesser known ideas (e.g. Shackle’s Model). 
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The aim of this project is to develop guidelines for ‘Best Practice’ approaches 
to  risk  and  uncertainty  in  environmental  economics.  Section  1  begins  by 
introducing the concepts of risk and uncertainty and highlights why they are 
important in environmental economics and policy and discusses some of the 
issues  surrounding  definitions  and  terminology  within  the  literature. 
Understanding  the  distinction  between  risk  and  uncertainty  is  important  as 
they are concepts which apply across many different disciplines and are often 
defined in different ways. Several of these disciplines, such as the physical 
sciences, engineering and socio-psychology, interact directly with economics 
in  an  environmental  setting.  Section  2  looks  at  existing  conceptual 
frameworks  from  the  literature  such  as  Adaptive  Management  and  the 
Precautionary Principle. Section 3 examines existing methodological solutions 
to  account  for  risk  and  uncertainty  in  environmental  economics.  Section  4 
devises an unique conceptual framework and a set of guidelines useful for 
application in the face of risk and uncertainty.  
 
Section 1    Defining risk and uncertainty 
 
The concepts of risk and uncertainty are defined both broadly and in terms of 
how they are accounted for in this paper. The definition and characterisation 
of  risk  are  followed  by  an  examination  of  the  concept  of  uncertainty  as  it 
relates to environmental economics. 
 
1.1  Defining and characterising risk 
 
Risk  relates  to  the  probability  of  an  event  occurring  and  the  effect  or 
consequences of that event. This, ‘scientific’ or ‘real’ risk is relatively easy to 
quantify and can be accounted for in most analyses with relative ease and is 
sometimes known as ‘statistical uncertainty’.  A further definitional component 
of  risk  is  to  distinguish  between  the  terms  ‘risk’  and  ‘hazard’.    The  term   4 
‘hazard’, commonly used interchangeably with risk, is often used in reference 
to  safety  standards  (e.g.  chemical  safety,  food  safety  and  biosecurity).    A 
hazard  can  be  defined  as  “the  way  in  which  an  object  (substance)  or  a 
situation may cause harm” (CEFIC, 2003).
1  Exposure is the extent to which 
the  recipient  (the  environment,  humans  or  animals)  is  exposed  to  or 
influenced  by  the  hazard.    The  risk  is  the  likelihood  that  harm  will  occur 
following exposure to the hazard – that is, without the simultaneous existence 
of the hazard and subsequent exposure to it, there is no risk (CEFIC, 2003). 
 
Methods to quantify risk (or statistical uncertainty) for parameters have been 
extensively developed, and are commonly based on the normal and the chi-
squared  distributions  (see  Figure  1.1).  Statistical  uncertainty  is  particularly 
important in the cases where very small data sets (e.g. rainfall records) are 
available.  Quantifying  the  effect  of  statistical  uncertainty  is  important  for 
sensible use of probabilistic methods. 
 
Risk (R) can be defined in terms of a decision rule α(x) which is a function of a 
set of possible actions that can be taken for every possible observation (x), 
where  x  is  a  random  variable  distributed  over  a  probability  density  (or 
distribution) function (pdf),  f(x) with a mean, µ and a variance, σ
2.  There are 
many  different pdf’s with  the  most  well  known  being  the  standard  ‘normal’ 
distribution  (or  bell  curve),  the  Chi  squared  (Χ
2)  distribution  and  the  F-
distribution (see Figure 1.1 below).   
 
                                                 
1 http://www.dehp-facts.com/upload/documents/webpage/document52.pdf 
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Figure 1.1  Probability  Distribution  Functions:  (a)  Normal  Distribution; 
(b) Chi Squared Distribution 
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There  are  three  main  methods  of  risk  analysis,  commonly  used  by 
economists, these include: the Expected Monetary Value, Expected value -
Variance decision theory and a more formal risk analysis.
3   
 
1.1.2  Types of Risk 
 
Although  statistical  definitions  may  be  adequate  for  specific  disciplines  or 
scenarios, Brun (1994) (in Sjöberg et al, 2004) comments that it is important 
to understand that risk appears to mean different things to different people. As 
a result, risk can be further characterised as either objective (technical risk) or 
subjective  risk  (risk  perception)  and  exogenous  or  endogenous  risk. 
Regardless of these characterisations, all risk concepts have one common 
element: “a distinction between reality and possibility” (Sjöberg et al, 2004, p 
7). 
 
‘Objective risk’ (also known as real, technical or scientific risk) is risk that can 
be  directly  attributed  with  a  quantifiable  value.  For  example  the  risk  of 
                                                 
2 Most econometrics and statistics textbooks provide detailed discussions on the nature and 
specifications of these and other probability density functions. 
3 Details available on request. 
2 κ    6 
premature  death  of  a  smoker  in  the  US  from  smoking  in  1990
4  was  39% 
(McGinnis and Foege, 1993). However, how people act and understand risk is 
learned by social and cultural conceptions and evaluations of the world and 
what it should, or should not be (Boholm, 1998).  
 
Therefore, ‘subjective risk’ (or risk perception) can be defined as: 
 
(i)  How  individuals  perceive  objective  risks  based  on  external 
influences  such  as  the  media,  previous  experiences,  knowledge 
(related  to  the  risk  target)  and  internal  personality  traits  such  as 
their degree of risk aversion or their attitude towards risk.
5   
(ii)  How individuals assess risks when they have no information (i.e. 
they do not have information pertaining to the objective risks).  This 
type of subjective risk is formed nearly entirely by internal emotive 
or attitudinal traits. 
 
For example, a risk averse adult who has never smoked may over-estimate 
the risk of premature death to others due to smoking as a result of numerous 
public health campaigns which highlight the dangers of smoking or because a 
family  member  died  of  lung  cancer  (personal  experience,  higher  level  of 
knowledge/understanding,  the  ‘dread  factor’).  Alternatively  a  teenager’s 
perception  of  premature  death  from  smoking,  for  example,  may  be 
considerably  lower  than  the  objective  risk  because  they  have  an  attitude 
towards risk that makes them believe that they will not be susceptible to a 




The ‘dread factor’ can be defined as the perceived lack of control, potential of 
catastrophic events, certainty of fatality, and unequal distributions of risks and 
benefits.  People are more comfortable and less likely to over-estimate the 
                                                 
4 39 in 100 people who were smokers in the US in 1990 died at a younger than expected age 
from a smoking related illness. 
5 For a more ‘economic’ discussion of subjective risk – see Dillon, 1971. 
6 Note that this is just a convenient example and that risk denial and unrealistic optimism is 
not limited to younger people or those with less experience or a limited understanding of the 
issues.    7 
effect of a risk they see as voluntary, controllable or natural (Slovic, 1987).  
This is commonly discussed in conjunction with the ‘unknown factor’ which is 
where people are more affected by and generally over-estimate the effects of 
a risk that they do not understand or have limited knowledge of, i.e. the risk is 
novel and unobservable  (i.e. no objective risk exists) (Slovic, 1987).  With 
reference to the above example, a fear of the unknown could come into play 
where a person does not have the knowledge of the links between smoking 
and cancer and may over-react if a member of their family were to contract 
this disease.  This may be likely to occur in less developed countries e.g. in 
South East Asia, where there is minimal public health education related to the 
risks of smoking to health. 
 
‘Exogenous risk’ is risk that is external to the decision maker that is it cannot, 
unlike ‘endogenous risk’, be controlled for by the subject or the system.  For 
example, a person’s risk of contracting lung cancer could be mitigated by that 
person choosing not to smoke, or by quitting smoking (endogenous risk), but 
their  genetic  predisposition  or  exposure  to  some  external  particles  (e.g. 
asbestos) is likely to be (at least partially) outside their control (exogenous 
risk)  and  therefore  their  ability  to  protect  themselves  from  contracting  this 
disease  may  be  minimal.     Ability  to  control for external  risks  can exist  to 
varying degrees dependent on the situation, for example, once on a plane the 
ability  to  control  for  the  risk  of  a  crash  is  entirely  exogenous,  however,  a 
person can chose not to fly thus reducing their risk of being in a plane crash 
effectively  to  zero.    Alternatively,  true  exogenous  risks,  which  cannot  be 
mitigated by choice, also exist such as the earth being hit by a comet. 
 
1.2  Defining uncertainty 
 
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  uncertainty  is  defined  in  terms  of  “radical” 
uncertainty  which  is  characterised  by  a  lack  of  knowledge  or  information.   
Uncertainty  occurs  where  objective  (or  subjective)  probabilities  cannot  be 
assigned  to  outcomes  and  the  full  range  of  possible  events  cannot  be 
identified (Peterson, 2006).   Other terminology often used includes: Knightian   8 
uncertainty  (Knight,  1921),  true  uncertainty,  ambiguity,  ignorance  or 
interdeterminancy. Although all these terms are widely used, they shall all be 
referred to as ‘uncertainty’ unless otherwise noted for clarity or distinction. 
 
It may be useful to examine uncertainty in similar terms used in defining risk.  
An uncertain event can be characterised as all future events, those where the 
probability of their occurrence is unknown and those events which are entirely 
unknown.    The  hazard,  which  may  lead  to  harm,  is  also  unknown 
probabilistically or  with any certainty:  the actual hazard resulting from the 
event  is  unknown  and  neither  is  the  degree  of  harm  that  the  hazard  may 
bestow.   
 
Within  environmental  economics,  uncertainty  is  particularly  relevant  for 
several reasons: 
1)  The  nature  of  the  system/s  or  the  problem/s  to  be  addressed  –  for 
example,  climate  change  –what  effect  may  it  have,  what  will  be 
affected and to what degree will this occur; 
2)  Issues of: 
a.  Irreversibility  –  damages  or  policy  may  be  partially  or  totally 
irreversible (from Pindyck, 2006); 
b.  Hysteresis  –  damages  or  policy  may  be  reversible  but  on  a 
different return path potentially changing the system; 
3)  And within (1) and (2) issues of imperfect information and sunk costs.   
 
These issues will be expanded on in Sections 2 and 3. 
Section 2    Accounting for risk and uncertainty 
 
This section initially focuses on the importance of having an understanding 
and  awareness  of  the  existence  of  issues  to  do  with  risk  and  uncertainty. 
Conceptual  frameworks  will  be  addressed  for  risk  assessment  and 
management  and  for  uncertainty,  commonly  applied  to  environmental 
problems.  This  will  follow  with  a  discussion  of  how  to  adapt  the  use  of   9 
traditional/neo-classical  economic  theory  applied  to  problems  of  risk  and 
uncertainty on a conceptual level. 
 
2.1  Embracing the concepts of risk and uncertainty 
 
Embracing  uncertainty…exposes  uncertainty  in  an  emphatic  manner  to 
simulate imaginative thinking about policy options that may be more robust 
or informative.  
(Walters, 1986) 
 
There  are  several  very  simple  ways  to  account  for  risk  and  uncertainty  in 
environmental economics and policy development. These include:  
(i)  Clearly  defining  the  problem  to  ensure  that  the  researcher 
thinks through any possible risks or issues of uncertainty and 
considers  how  they  may  affect  the  research  or  policy  in 
question;  
(ii)  Utilising existing frameworks such as Adaptive Management 
and the Precautionary Principle which have been created for 
problems such as those in environmental economics and their 
resulting policy options;  
(iii)  Being aware of, and accounting for, the different perceptions 
and  attitudes  towards  risks  of  different  actors  within  the 
system, especially the general public.  
2.1.1  Defining the problem 
 
Avoiding ambiguity and effectively accounting for risk and uncertainty requires 
clearly defining the problem at hand to limit the element of surprise and allow 
the researcher to produce informed and relevant solutions to the problem.  
 
The  ideas  below  are  adapted  from  the  United  States’  Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA). This process has been designed to examine 
ecological or human health issues and does not consider the broader picture   10 
of socio-economics and the existing policy framework. As a result, the US 
EPA’s  process  has  been  further  adapted  here  to  attempt  to  account  for 
problems  with  a  multi-disciplinary  focus,  particularly  consideration  of  some 
political-economic issues. 
 
•  What is the nature of the biophysical problem?   
o  What is the biophysical process? What form does it take? 
o  Whom or what does the process affect? 
o  Is  the  process  solely  an  ecological  issue  or  does  it  impact 
humans directly (i.e. their health or lifestyles)?  
o  What are the hazards (risks) of concern? 
o  Point versus non-point source hazards. 
o  How does exposure (either human or ecological, or both) occur? 
o  What is the scale of the problem? 
o  Over  what  time  frame  will  it  occur?  And  is  there  a  critical 
(threshold) point at which the system may change? 
o  Are there possible issues of irreversibility?  
o  How  resilient  may  the  system  be?  To  what  degree  may  the 
system  be  able  to  adapt  (either  autonomously  or  with  active 
management)? 
o  How  resilient  may  those  who  are  affected  be?  And  to  what 
degree may they be able to adapt? 
•  What are the current regulatory arrangements and how may they affect 
the issue? 
•  What social/economic framework may be best to apply for the analysis 
– Cost Benefit Analysis? 
•  What  are  the  uncertainties  that  may  affect  any  component  of  this 
problem? What might be uncertain? 
o  The likelihood or magnitude of events? 
o  The process in which unknown events translate into outcomes? 
o  Where or when may they occur? 
o  What  information  do  we  have  that  may  help  us  assess  the 
benefits and costs of these uncertainties?   11 
o  What can we learn in the future? – are there structured ways we 
could think about what the future holds? 
 
(Adapted  from  the  US  EPA’s  Planning  Phase  of  Risk  Assessment:  EPA’s 
Guides to Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (1998)).
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The idea behind the US EPA’s structure is to ask the right questions so as to 
be able to adequately characterise the risks associated with the problem, and 
to have an awareness of the possibility of uncertainty within the system and 
where  it  may  have  an  impact  on  the  research  or  policy  work  conducted. 
Gathering  quantitative  information  and  conducting  analysis  is  the  second 
stage in the US EPA’s process, followed by risk characterisation which feeds 
directly  into  the  final  stage  of  risk  management.  Risk  characterisation  is  a 
culmination of the work undertaken in the planning, information and analysis 
components,  and  attempts  to  provide  quantitative  risk  estimates  to  help 
answer  the  preceding  questions.  However,  as  defined  in  this  paper, 
uncertainties cannot be quantified and that some risks that relate to socio-
economics may be very difficult to quantify due to either the nature of the risk 
and/or unavailability of the information.  
 
2.1.2  Established frameworks and principles 
 
A.  The Adaptive Management Framework: 
 
Adaptive Management (also known as Adaptive Resource Management) is 
defined as an iterative process of updating policy through research (Walters, 
1986). Originally developed by Canadian ecologists Walters and Holling in the 
1970s, it is now widely used in Australia and the US in environmental policy 
see figure 2.1 below, initially in fisheries management, but has been recently 
applied to many other areas.
8   
                                                 
7 http://www.epa.gov/riskassessment/ 
8 Some Australian examples include Allan, 2008; Bennett et al, 2005; and Gilmour et al, 1999.   12 
 
 
Figure 2.1  The Adaptive Management Framework 
(Adapted  from  CSIRO  Marine  &  Atmospheric  Research,  Management 
Strategy Evaluation).
9   
 
Walters (1986) focused on four main aims of Adaptive Management: 
 
1.  To bound management problems in terms of explicit and hidden 
objectives, practical constraints and factors in policy analysis; 
2.  To represent all known systems in terms of dynamic behaviour 
with  clear  assumptions  and  predictions  to  allow  learning  from 
error; 
3.  To represent uncertainty through time in relation to management 
actions  using  models  consistent  with  experience  to  lead  to 
improved productivity; 
4.  To design balanced policies that provide for continuing resource 
production whilst increasing understanding - e.g. use of decision 
tables or matrices. 
 











improving   13 
The overall objective of Adaptive Management is to reduce uncertainty over 
time through monitoring and evaluation. Decision making may simultaneously 
maximise one or more objectives and, either through research or ‘doing’, gain 
information needed to improve future management, this is represented simply 
in Figure 2.1 above.  Ideally, an element of efficient reduction of uncertainty 
over time is desirable, where information is collected about initially unknown 
factors, whose expected costs are less than expected benefits.  
 
There are always limitations, however, and effective Adaptive Management 
cycles typically require a long time horizon (Lee, 1999).   Lee (1999) noted 
that  in the  late  1990s  there  was  only  one successful  example  of  Adaptive 
Management  working  effectively  –  and  that  was  the  case  of  fisheries  in 
northwest  Australia
10  (1988)  and  that  it  took  over  a  decade  to  achieve 
practical  results  in  fisheries  management  (Lee,  1999).      Adaptive 
Management does not work as well for problems where the outcomes are 
difficult to measure, when there are many policy options available, or where 
there  are  problems  with  extreme  temporal  uncertainty,  such  as  climate 
change.    Lee  (1999)  also  warned  against  the  practical  problems  of 
implementing the Adaptive Management framework such as having a clearly 
defined problem that can be translated into practice; an understanding of the 
long term and dynamic nature of the system and the interactions between the 
physical and human worlds (this includes interaction within the human realm 
e.g.  stakeholder  consensus  or  issues  to  do  with  benefit  distribution);  an 
understanding of the costs and benefits of the policy; and having effective and 
continuous  management  and  leadership  of  the  process.    Without  proper 
design and implementation Adaptive Management is no more than a ‘buzz 
word’.   
 
B.  The Precautionary Principle: 
 
The Precautionary Principle is taken from the German principle of Vorsorge or 
‘foresight’ which was first introduced in German law in the 1970s (Gollier and 
                                                 
10 This was a project by the CSIRO in 1988 designed by Keith Sainsbury.  See Lee (1999) for 
more details.   14 
Treich,  2003).  Since  then  it  has  been  applied  to  international  conventions 
such as 1st International Conference on Protection of the North Sea (1984), 
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) and The Rio Convention (1992). It is now the 
most  notable  anticipatory  principle  in  international  law  (Gollier  and  Treich, 
2003). 
 
Precautionary  Principle  is  a  conceptual  approach  which  may  be  an 
appropriate  foundation  to  base  decision  making  under  conditions  of  large 
uncertainty (Goddard, 1997) and can be defined as follows: 
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific understanding shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
 
(Principle 15, The Rio Declaration, 1992) 
There  are,  however,  many  other  definitions  of  precaution,  and  it  may  be 
defined  as  "caution  in  advance";  "caution  practiced  in  the  context  of 
uncertainty";  or  “informed  prudence”.  These  terms  all  suggest  a  need  by 
decision  makers  to  anticipate  damage  before  it  occurs.  Further,  it  is  the 
responsibility of the decision maker to establish that the proposed activity will 
not (or is very unlikely to) result in significant damage.
11 Further, if the level of 
damage is likely to be high there is an obligation for action to be taken to 
prevent or minimise such harm even when it is unknown whether the damage 
will  be  high  or  is  even  likely  to  occur.  The  need  for  control  measures 
increases  with  both  the  level  of  possible  damage  and  the  degree  of 
uncertainty. 
The  Precautionary  Principle  has  been  widely  applied  in  areas  of  the 
environment  due  to  the  large  degree  of  uncertainty  in  this  field.  The 
Precautionary Principle has been used within Australia in both a policy and 
                                                 
11 ‘Significant’ damage can be defined as damage that has a negative impact on social 
welfare or the environment.   15 
legal approach in the environmental field. 
12 Policy examples include the NSW 
Protection  of  the  Environment  Administration  Act,  1991;  and  the  Inter-
Government (COAG) Agreement on Environment, 1992. A widely cited legal 
example of the Precautionary Principle in practice, Leatch v National Parks 
and Wildlife Service (1993) where Justice Stein noted that policy makers have 
a “Common sense duty to be cautious”. 
13 
 
The Precautionary Principle and policy: 
 
There are some concerns that the Precautionary Principle may distort policy 
by removing focus from more perilous hazards and instead focusing on less 
clearly  defined  hazards.  This  may  result  in  significant  social  and 
environmental costs (Peterson, 2006a). However, by assessing not only the 
importance and relevance of each element but also by considering the costs 
and benefits of the different policy possibilities may help to minimise these 
negative  outcomes  (See  Figure  2.3  below),  and  further  highlights  the 
importance  of  the  economist’s  role  in  application  of  the  Precautionary 
Principle. 
 
Figure  2.3  attempts  to  explain  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  Precautionary 
Principle  within  a  simple  policy  process  and  the  steps  taken  in  designing, 
assessing,  implementing  and  evaluating  the  policy.  Note  the  similarities 
between this and Adaptive Management, described above.  At the initial time 
period (t0) consideration is made both of the current situations and what may 
happen in the future (t1).  From this point an analysis is conducted to assess 
the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  existing  environmental  and  regulatory 
parameters using a Cost Benefit Analysis.   
 
In a simple world, if benefits outweigh the costs then the policy change should 
be  implemented,  and  then  its  performance  evaluated  in  t1  and  adapted  if 
                                                 
12 For a more comprehensive discussion of the Precautionary Principle and its applications in 
Australia see Peterson, 2006a. 
13 This ‘widely cited example’ itself shows how blurred the definition and interpretation of the 
Precautionary Principle can be in practice.  Is the Precautionary Principle merely a case of 
applying ‘common sense’ caution?   16 
required.  However, it is possible that the solution is not so clear cut, and 
although benefits maybe greater than costs in the short term, there may be 
information to suggest that this may not be the case in the long run.  If this 
information is available then this must be taken into account when conducting 
the Cost Benefit Analysis.  If costs outweigh the benefits then there needs to 
be further consideration of the future situation.  If the information required to 
assess the situation will not be available until t1 there may be a delay until the 
policy can be evaluated.  If this occurs, it is important to understand that there 
may be losses made by waiting for t1 and as a result attempting to determine 
the  maximum  loss  made  is  desirable,  although  not  fitting  with  the 
Precautionary  Principle.
14  The  Precautionary  Principle  essentially  suggests 
that any loss as a result of waiting for further information may be crucial and 
the policy maker should act to ensure that there is no (further) environmental 
degradation;  this  may  or  may  not  allow  time  for  the  collation  of  further 
information in the future. 
                                                 




Figure 2.3  Precautionary Principle and the Policy Process 
 
Limitations of the Precautionary Principle: 
 
The Precautionary Principle has many limitations, both from a popular view as 
well as from an expert view.  Generally opponents criticise the Principle on 
two  fronts,  first  that  the  Principle  undermines  growth,  development  and 
business-as-usual and limits innovation (Bailey, 1999; Peterson, 2006a), i.e. it   18 
is inherently risk averse (Quiggin, no date). Second, the Principle is commonly 
criticised for not being clearly defined, nor having clear guidelines for policy 
implementation (Cussen, 2009 and Peterson, 2006b). 
15   
 
However,  the  applicability  and  current  popularity  of  the  Precautionary 
Principle  may  be  a  good  premise  for  sensible  inclusion  (or  at  least 
consideration) in the creation of guidelines for accounting for uncertainty.    
 
Adaptations to the Precautionary Principle: 
 
An  alternative  way  of  thinking  of  the  Precautionary  Principle  is  to  focus, 
instead of being cautious, on flexibility and adaptation, that is, “keeping your 
options  open”.    Flexibility  allows  a  short  term  decision  to  be  made  with 
‘caution’ whilst further research is undertaken to enlighten the decision maker 
on possible, relevant alternatives or by converting the problem at hand into 
one that involves well-understood alternatives (Quiggin, no date).   Quiggin’s 
‘flexible’  approach  to  the  Precautionary  Principle  means  that  it  is  a  useful 
component of the decision making process, a constraint on the application of 
decision theory, not part of decision theory itself (Quiggin, no date).  This idea 
of  ‘flexibility’  links  with  the  seminal  works  of  Arrow  and  Fisher  (1974)  and 
Henry (1974) who focused on the benefit of keeping options open so as to be 
able to adjust policies in light of better information. This is defined as a ‘quasi-
option  value’  or  an  ‘option  value’,  and  is  an  extra  source  of  benefit  to  be 
included in any cost benefit analysis of the net benefits of policy alternatives 
(Ingham and Ulph, 2005).  ‘Options’, however, require knowledge as to how 
and when the approach could be adopted, how ‘open’ the process can be and 
what type of methodology could be used to assess such a situation.
16   
                                                 
15 Sandin (1999) lists 19 different meanings of the Precautionary Principle. 
16 See Section 3.2.6 for a discussion of ‘options’ which are regarded as one of the main 
techniques for accounting for uncertainty within an (environmental) economics framework. 
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2.2  Updating ‘standard’ economic theory  
 
The  neoclassical  economic  framework  of  maximising  utility  is  deterministic 
and Expected Utility (EU) is an expansion of this with at least one random 
variable.    EU assumes  rational  consumers are  expected to maximise  their 
utility subject to constraints, is one of the most widely adapted frameworks in 
economic theory. The EU framework is the main tool for analysis of decisions 
under risk with known (linear) probabilities (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944).    In  1954,  Savage  extended  the  EU  framework  to  account  for 
‘subjectivity’  (i.e.  unknown  probabilities),  this  is  known  as  the  Subjective 
Expected  Utility  (SEU)  model,  and  shows  that  ‘rational’  choices  of  the 
subjective decision maker can be derived from their expected utility.  These 
models are widely used because their mathematical structure is applicable to 
both theoretical and empirical situations, and because they work well when 
probabilities are clear and well understood (Shaw and Woodward, 2007).  The 
application  of  the  EU  framework  in  environmental  economics  is  similar  to 
other areas of economics, with popular methods such as Pareto Optimality 
and Contingent Valuation based on EU theory.
 17   
 
However, there is evidence that conventional EU theory (linear probabilities) 
does  not  apply  in  the  context  of  less  clearly  identifiable  risks  or  true 
uncertainty these are important for the development of environmental policy 
because it shows that there are reasons why alternative theories should be 
considered over standard EU theory. 
 
•  Allais  Paradox  (1953):      show  an  inconsistency  of  actual  observed 
choices with the predictions of expected utility theory. It indicates that 
individual’s have a tendency of individuals to react differently to high-
                                                 
17 Further detailed explanation of the traditional EU framework and some of its variants (SEU, 
RDEU and MMEU), is available on request.   20 
consequence,  low  probability  event. 
18,
19    This  implies  that  the 
assumption  of  linear  probabilities  is  not  always  satisfied;  in  other 
words,  decision  makers  are  not  able  to  assess  the  magnitude  of 
risks/uncertainties objectively and tend to ‘rank’ risks with a high level 
of  dread,  even  if  they  are  unlikely  to  eventuate,  as  being  more 
“important” than a less catastrophic but more likely risk.   
 
•  Ellsberg  Paradox  (1961):  people  demonstrate  an  aversion  to 
ambiguity
20 and have a ‘source dependence’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992).    Essentially,  a  decision  maker  may  avoid  prioritising  issues 
where  uncertainty  abounds,  especially  if  they  feel  ignorant  of  the 
situation, but less so when they feel they have a good understanding or 
knowledge of the situation.  
 
•  Framing  Effects:    Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1986)  noted  that  people 
tend to think of possible outcomes in terms of a framing effect, relative 
to a certain reference point (status quo) rather than to the final status. 
A framing effect is the manner in which a rational choice is posed, i.e. 
the  language  used  and  the  scenario  developed  when  presenting 
people with a risky situation. Essentially, people tend to conceive a risk 
framed  in  positive  terms  as  being  preferable  to  a  risk  presented  in 
negative terms, regardless of the fact that both are identical.  
 
•  Loss Aversion:  People also have different risk attitudes towards gains 
and losses and are more concerned with potential losses than potential 
gains (loss aversion) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).
21 
 
In order to account for these deficiencies some researchers have developed 
adapted EU models which relax some of the traditional assumptions and allow 
non-linear weights on the probabilities.  Some of the best examples of this are 
                                                 
18 Further details available on request. 
19 See Fundenberg and Levine, 2009 for an application to risk aversion. 
20 Ambiguity here is synonymous with Knightian uncertainty. 
21 This is the underlying premise for Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1994).   21 
Quiggin’s  (1991)  Rank  Dependent  Expected  Utility  (RDEU)  which  allows 
probabilities  to  enter  non-linearly  into  an  individual’s  objective  function, 
avoiding the Allais Paradox;
22 and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin 
EU model (MMEU) assumes individuals assess probability based on their own 
personal  experience,  and  which  was  developed  to  explain  the  Ellsberg 
Paradox. 
23  
Section 3    Models and methods 
 
This  section  looks  at  existing  methods  for  accounting  for  risk  and  also 
proposes ways that theoretical models can be extended to account for true 
uncertainty.   
3.1  Traditional techniques for objective risk analysis 
 
Objective  risks  are  relatively  easily  quantifiable  and  hence there are many 
standard  approaches  to  accounting  for  risk  in  environmental  economics. 
Table 3.1 presents a list of theoretical, empirical and qualitative techniques for 
accounting  for  objective  risk  (as  defined  in  this  paper)  and  their  relevant 
references.  
Table 3.1  Some techniques for accounting for risk in environmental 
economics 
24 
Method  Brief description  References 
Theories 
Expected  utility 
theory  (and 
variations) 
 
As  discussed  in  Section  2.2.  
Accounts  for  people’s  personal 
preferences. 
Von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern,  1944; 
Savage, 1954;  
Machina, 1987;  
Gilboa  and  Schmeidler, 
1989;  Quiggin,  1993  and 
2005 
Cost  of  risk 
bearing 
 
The  amount  of  expected  income  a 
risk averse household is willing to pay 
in order to avoid the risk 
Arrow, 1964; Fisher, 1973; 
Mäler and Fisher, 2005 
                                                 
22 Machina (1987) has also conducted expansive research in this area. 
23 Details available on request. 
24 This list is not exhaustive and there are many other techniques that are used in the 
literature or in practice.   22 
State  Contingent 
Approach  
Uncertainty is represented by a set of 
possible  states  of  nature  and 
uncertain outputs by vectors of state 
contingent goods. Originally designed 
for production uncertainty but equally 
applicable  to  choice  under 
uncertainty. 
Arrow  and  Debreu,  1954; 
Chambers  and  Quiggin, 
1998,  2000,  2006;
  25 
Chavas,  2008.    (Note: 
very  little  literature  from 
Arrow and Debreu’s initial 
study  in  1954  to 




Irreversible  shifts  in  state  of 
ecosystems where each system has 
threshold where they become ‘weak’ 
and  are  not  able  to  continue  to 
function in the same way. When risks 
can  be  quantified  ER  can  be 
explained  by  distance  to  the 
threshold. 




Expected  value 
analysis 
 
Takes  into  account  the  size  of  the 
payout (hazard) and the probability of 




Used within a CBA to account for the 
value  of  money  over  time,  following 
the  premise  that  benefits  or  costs 
today  will  not  be  valued  the  same 
way  by  future  generations.
26    The 
value of money used is a risk that is 
taken  in  valuing  environmental 
benefits for future generations to the 




Stern,  2007;  Nordhaus, 
2007 
                                                 
25 The definition of uncertainty in this paper is synonymous with scientific uncertainty.  This 
differs from the defined version of uncertainty as discussed in this paper. Therefore, it was 
deemed more appropriate that this be represented as a technique that accounts for risk within 
a system. 
26 A very public debate on discount rates and climate change ensued in 2006 with the UK 
Stern Review on climate change, using a very different discounting approach to Nordhaus’ 
US equivalent.  This highlights the importance of discounting in CBA especially for projects 
with high levels of risk. See, the UK HM Treasury (2003) “Green Book”, Annex 6 available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Green_Book2_03.pdf 
and specifically Stern (2006)’s Annex to Chapter 2 available at 
 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Chapter_2_Technical_Annex.pdf 
Also, see Nordhaus (2007) and Dasgupta (2007). 
27 Quiggin’s definition of uncertainty in this paper is synonymous with scientific uncertainty – 
i.e. “random variables with a given probability distribution” (p21). This differs from the defined 
version of uncertainty as discussed in this paper. Therefore, it was deemed more appropriate 




A  study  of  how  the  variation 
(‘scientific  uncertainty’)  in  model 
output  can  be  apportioned, 
qualitatively  or  quantitatively,  to 
different  sources  of  variation  in  the 
input of a model (either parameters or 
variables).    Commonly  used in  CBA 
to  account  for  the  likely  variation  in 
inputs or outcomes. 
 
See  most  environmental 
economics  textbooks  or 
texts  on  Cost  Benefit 
Analysis  such  as 
Boardman et al, 2006  for 
further information. 
Monte  Carlo 
simulation 
 
Useful for modelling phenomena with 
significant risk in inputs (randomised 
sampling technique). 
As above 
Probability  density 




Distribution of a random variable is a 
function  which  describes the density 
of  probability  at  each  point  in  the 
sample  space  (discrete  or 
continuous). 
See  most  generic 




Analysis  (or 
Probabilistic  Risk 
Assessment) 
A variation on Monte Carlo analysis, 
where a two-stage process is applied 
to separate uncertainty and variability 
in risks. 
Frey, 1992; NRC, 2009. 
Value  of 
Information 
Analysis 
At a basic level VOI provides a set of 
methods  for  “optimizing  efforts  and 
resources to gather, to process, and 
to apply information to help decision 
makers  achieve  their  objectives” 
(NRC, 2009).    The process begins 
by  determining,  given  statistical 
uncertainty, the preferred option and 
the  net  benefit  associated  with  any 
information gain that may cause the 
decision maker to change to another 
option  in  the  future.  Generally 
perceived  as  a  very  complex 
procedure  which  is  difficult  to 
implement  due  to  data  and  skills 
requirements. 
NRC, 2009.   24 
 
Qualitative Techniques 
Risk Assessment  A  conceptual  or  practical  framework 
designed  to  account  for  and/or 
consider all the risks within a system.  
A decision making tool. 
EPA, 1998. 
Expert  Judgement 
(or  Expert 
Elicitation) 
The  opinions  of  professionals, 
academics  or  scientists  are  used  to 
fill  the  gaps  when  uncertainties  are 
large, complex  or  when  there  is  not 
enough information available to make 
a  decision  using  the  usual  tools 
available. 
Spetzler and von Holstein, 
1975 
 
3.2  Existing methods to account for true uncertainty 
There are several methods that are currently used by economists to analyse 
policy which can either be updated to account for true uncertainty (e.g. Cost 
Benefit Analysis) or have been developed as techniques that are designed 
specifically to investigate uncertain issues (e.g. Real Options Analysis).  This 
section examines a list of possible methods that may assist the policy analyst 
when faced with uncertain decisions. 
 
3.2.1  Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): ex ante versus ex post 
analyses 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis is one of the most widely used and accepted economic 
approaches  in  the  realm  of  environmental  policy,  and  can  be  used  in 
conjunction with many of the techniques which account for risk, as outlined 
above (Table 3.1), primarily discounting and sensitivity analysis.  However, 
once true uncertainty is introduced, some of these standard techniques are 
not, on their own, adequate solutions to the problem.  Uncertainty should not 
undermine the usefulness of CBA as a tool and a broader interpretation of 
CBA should be taken when uncertainties exist to accommodate this issue.  
Young (2001) suggests that CBA should be integral to all levels of the policy 
analysis as it is a useful technique to weigh up policy options and to organise 
and consolidate available information.   25 
 
Further ways of accounting for uncertainty in CBA include examining the costs 
and benefits of a policy both prior to implementation (ex ante) and after a 
period of time (or at the conclusion or review of the policy) (ex post).  This 
provides  researchers  with  an  increased  understanding  of  the  problem, 
including whether or not their initial CBA estimates were correct and whether 
or not the policy has achieved its outcome. This enables updating of current 
information  and  possible  adaptation  of  the  policy  to  better  fit  the  problem. 
Where  feasible  both  analyses  should  take  place  and  then  the  differences 
between them should be compared and adjustments to, or recommendations 
about, the policy should be made.
28 However, it is often the case that neither 
time nor resources are available to do this in which case justification should 
be made as to why only an ex ante or an ex post approach has been taken. 
 
Ex ante and ex post analyses can also be examined in the non-traditional 
sense  of  the  term:  i.e.  opinions  of  the  public  versus  opinions  of  experts 
(Cropper and Oates, 1992). Should the ‘expert’ decision be made to ensure 
the  best  interest  of  the  public?  Or,  should  consumer  sovereignty  be 
maintained? This would imply collecting further information through surveying, 
for example contingent valuation studies, to examine the differences between 
expert and lay assessments of the resource or policy options.  
 
A further way CBA can be updated to account for uncertainty is to conduct 
‘scenario  planning’  which  is  essentially  a  qualitative  form  of  a  sensitivity 
analysis.    Scenario  planning  requires  comparison  of  a  set  of  two  to  three 
mutually  exclusive  ‘what  if’  options  for  the  future  socioeconomic  and/or 
physical environment which should be consistent and logical and are likely to 
directly influence the project at hand (NSW Treasury, 2007). 
 
                                                 
28 This updating and evaluation of information throughout the process of conducting CBAs at 
an ex-ante and ex-post level is similar to the ideas behind Adaptive Management (see 
Section 2.1.2 above).   26 
3.2.2  The Shackle Model  
 
A  less  well  known,  yet  formally  derived,  model  of  true  uncertainty  is  the 
Shackle Model of Surprise (1949).
29 The model was developed by Shackle in 
the 1940s and can be considered a “powerful alternative to the application of 
expected utility theory to cases of hard uncertainty” (Young, 2001).  Shackle’s 
theoretical ideas stem from Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921), and his formal 
theory is based on three main concepts: 
(i)  Replacement  of  probability  as  a  measurement  of  uncertainty 
with a measurement termed the “degree of (potential) surprise”; 
(ii)  Creation  of  a  decision  or  action  choice  index  (ascendancy 
function)  which  evaluates  the  outcomes  and  their  degree  of 
surprise; 
(iii)   Use of a gambler’s preference map so that prospects can be 
represented as a loss or a gain. 
(Young, 2001) 
 
Essentially,  Shackle’s  refusal  to  accept  that  probabilities  can  explain  truly 
(Knightian) uncertain events makes his approach unique.  Shackle’s “degree 
of surprise” is therefore defined as a measure of the possibility of an event.
 30, 
31  Shackle’s  Model  has  been  widely  criticised  by  more  mainstream 
economists due to its theoretical arbitrariness and ‘simplicity, however, there 
are four advantages of Shackle’s model when decisions are made under true 
uncertainty (Bekker and Gaunt, 2006): 
 
                                                 
29 See Earl, 1983 (for a behavioural economics review); Ford, 1994 (provides a general 
review); Vickers, 1994 and Katzner, 1995 (further developed Shackle’s model); Perry, 1989; 
Dalmazzone, 1995 and Young, 2001 (for applications to environmental uncertainty).  All cited 
in Young, 2001. 
30 This is the most contentious of Shackle’s assumptions, and he stands, until the 1970s, the 
lone economist to not just critic the standard approach of using probabilities to measure 
uncertainty, but was also the only one who attempted to develop a formal model for 
explaining why they should not be used (for an interesting account of how the Shackle model 
fits within the history of decision theory and its relationship with modern day decision theory 
see Basili and Zappia, 2006). 
31 For applications of Shackle’s model in environmental (and other) areas where uncertainty 
affects  decision  making  see  Young  (2001)  –  highways;  Bekker  and  Gaunt  (2007)  –  rural 
electricity project; Li and Sinha (2009) – highways. 
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1.  The notion of surprise, unlike that of probability, is applicable to 
unique events; 
2.  The  surprise  function  is  non-distributional,  this  implies  an 
incomplete list of outcomes; 
3.  Potential surprise is non-additive and has no requirement to sum 
to unity; 
4.  Surprise and ascendancy functions are separated into desired 
and undesired outcomes which allow separate consideration of 
uncertainty aversion to gains and losses. 
 
3.2.3  Issues of irreversibility and hysteresis 
 
The concept of endogenous irreversibility suggests that the effects of a new 
policy may be hard or even impossible to reverse (Pindyck, 2006). Pindyck 
(2006) notes that there are two kinds of irreversibility and that they work in 
opposing directions: 
•  Sunk  costs  to  society  are  usually  inevitable  when  a  policy  creates 
environmental degradation.
32   
•  Environmental damage is usually totally or partially irreversible. 
 
Generally  speaking  uncertainty  is  the  main  reason  that  sunk  costs  will  be 
incurred and damage cannot be rectified.  There are several key reasons this 
is the case: 
 
1.  Lack of information on, or understanding of, the system(s) – e.g.: 
a.   The complexity of the system(s) may mean that the system is 
not sufficiently understood and therefore the policy option does 
not adequately protect the system(s) and allows for continued or 
unexpected degradation (and perhaps this degradation remains 
undetected for a long period of time); 
                                                 
32This may be due to construction (i.e. economic development) – there will be a small loss 
due to capital and labour services and materials being used at a given point in time, but these 
are then often freed up later on; and/or the cost of the loss of ‘paradise’ which is a larger 
irreversibility than the costs of development. 
   28 
b.  The degree of interaction between the system(s) and society is 
not clearly defined – and therefore the true costs and benefits 
cannot be specified, again leading to a policy option that does 
not maximise welfare and has longer term negative impacts on 
either the environmental system(s) or society; 
c.  The current and/or future ‘value’ of the resource is unknown – 
e.g. a wilderness area may be protected for the benefit of future 
generations regardless of whether the benefit of not protecting it, 
and  opening  say  a  ski  resort,  is  actually  more  welfare 
maximising in the long run. 
 
2.  The policy option may be implemented by society in a way that was 
unexpected  (i.e.  collateral  damage)  and  may  mean  that  levels  of 
environmental degradation are maintained or even increased.  This is 
especially  likely  to  be  the  case  if  society  or  a  key  stakeholder  is 
benefiting directly from the policy option.
33 If future policy costs and 
benefits  are  uncertain,  the  sunk  costs  create  an  opportunity  cost  of 
adopting  the  policy,  rather  than  waiting  for  more  information  about 
environmental impacts and their economic consequences. A traditional 
cost benefit analysis will therefore be biased towards adopting this type 
of policy (Pindyck, 2006). 
 
3.  If damage is totally or partially irreversible then adopting a policy now 
rather  than  waiting  has  a  sunk  benefit  (negative  opportunity  cost).   
This  often  means  the  adoption  of  more  conservative  policies  than 
would be otherwise used.  This implies that a standard cost benefit 
analysis will be biased against policy adoption (Pindyck, 2006).   
 
For example, if a rise in sea temperatures causes irreversible damage to a 
reef then failure to act immediately will result in increased damage and the 
cost of acting now, although uncertain, is not as great as the loss of the reef if 
                                                 
33 
An example could be the protection of native vegetation through the banning of land clearing.  Society benefits from the increased availability 
of the native vegetation (usually indirectly) however, it is possible that specific native vegetation can become invasive causing problems for other 
native flora or fauna species (i.e. upsetting biodiversity) which may have a negative effect on the natural environment.   29 
no action is taken. In other words, the level of uncertainty over the costs and 
benefits will greatly affect how important the irreversibilites are.  
 
A  solution  to  these  types  of  problems  is  to  implement  gradual  changes  in 
policy through updating information, rather than make one single decision, to 
ensure that there are minimal negative effects on either the environment or to 
maximise net social benefits (Zhao and Kling, 2002).  
 
3.2.4  Safe Minimum Standards 
 
Similar  to  both  endogenous  irreversibility  and  the  Precautionary  Principle, 
SMS  is  a  concept  first  developed  in  1952  by  an  agricultural  economist, 
Ciriacy-Wantrup, where Safe Minimum Standards (SMS) are defined as an 
objective of conservation policy, achieved by avoiding the ‘critical zone’, “that 
is, those physical conditions, brought about by human action, which would 
make it uneconomical to halt and reverse depletion” (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1952), 
or in other words ‘the threshold below which loss is catastrophic’. Crowards 
(1996)  commented  that  “‘large’  future  losses  will  exceed  the  net  present 
benefits  of  development  (which  represent  the  ‘cost’  to  society  of  insuring 
against  such  losses)”.  In  other  words,  SMS  is  designed  to  “explicitly 
incorporate into the decision making process the uncertainty that surrounds 
irreversible impacts on the natural environment” (Crowards, 1996).  Not unlike 
the Precautionary Principle, SMS lacks theoretical formality and clarity in its 
definition and application, particularly across disciplines. 
 
An alternative definition of SMS deals with a situation where conservation is 
treated as the highest priority unless the benefits from the development are 
regarded  as  so  great  as  to  justify  any  unknown,  potential  and  substantial 
losses (Bishop, 1978).   Bishop (1978) formalised Ciriacy-Wantrup’s concept 
using game theory and making use of the Wald Criteria to minimise maximum 
losses (minimax).
34 This approach is noted by Crowards (1996) and Hohl and 
                                                 
34 See Hohl and Tisdell (1992) for details on Bishop’s game theoretic approach to SMS.   30 
Tisdell (1992) as being ‘overly conservative’ due to the pessimistic nature of 
the minimax process.   
 
SMS can also be viewed as a constraint (lexicographic preferences) i.e. when 
assessing  economic  efficiency  of  a  project  it  must  be  recognised  that 
economic efficiency is a lower priority than the SMS criterion (Perman et al., 
2003).   It  is  believed,  that economics  cannot  truly  account for  ‘pure’  (non-
statistical) uncertainty and as a result, economic tools such as CBA, expected 
utility theory and options theory are inadequate in addressing problems with 
true uncertainty and irreversibility (Bishop, 1978; 1979).  For example if there 
is a potential extinction of a species for which there maybe no substitute, then 
economic efficiency should not be the priority, as the benefit of retaining that 
species is far greater than any economic cost that may have to be sustained 
in order to protect that species.   
 
Should  irreversible  loss  or  true  uncertainty  exist  then  an  SMS  constraint 
should be implemented (Crowards, 1996).  Crowards (1996) emphasised that: 
  
The fundamental difference between SMS and the traditional economic 
approach  is  that  rather  than  aim  strictly  to  maximise  expected  net 
benefits  to  society,  SMS  acknowledges  the  limitations  of  attaching 
probabilities to future outcomes in the face of extreme uncertainty … It 
concentrates instead on identifying appropriate standards and (in the 
words  of  Ciriacy-Wantrup,  1964)  “choosing  premium  payments  and 
benefits in such a way that maximum possible losses are minimised”. 
 
3.2.5  Decision Analysis  
Decision analysis is broad technique for assisting with decision making in an 
uncertain environment and has its roots in the utility theory of von Neumann   31 
and Morgenstern (1947).  Decision analysis can be defined in several ways.  
Keeney (1982)
35 suggests two definitions: 
 
(i)  A  formalization  (sic)  of  common  sense  for  decision  problems 
which are too complex for informal use of common sense. 
 
(ii)  A  philosophy,  articulated  by  a  set  of  logical  axioms,  and  a 
methodology  and  collection  of  systematic  procedures,  based  upon 
those  axioms,  for  responsibly  analysing  the  complexities  inherent  in 
decision problems. 
 
Decision analysis is a useful tool for all decision problems where there are 
several  possible  ‘solutions’  with  specific  and  uncertain  consequences,  and 
different  costs  and  benefits,  and  where  only  one  of  these  ‘solution’ 
alternatives  must  be  applied.    This  ‘solution’  is  determined  through  a 
structured manner (see Figure 3.3) using the principles of EU
36 to value the 
preferences of each alternative to decision makers. 
 
                                                 
35 Keeney (1982) provides a good discussion of the finer points of decision analysis for the 
non-decision analyst.  His paper is available at: 
http://teaching.pdesign.ch/2006/DADT/Keeney1982.pdf 
36 See discussion in Section 2.2.   32 
 
Figure 3.3  A schematic representation of the steps of decision analysis 
(Keeney (1982), Figure 1, p 808). 
 
A more specific component of the broad technique of decision analysis is the 
use of Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and the formation of decision 
trees in an effort to quantify and account for uncertain behaviour.   
 
MCDA  aims  to  incorporate  quantitative  modelling  outputs,  such  as  risk 
assessments, with more qualitative research, such as CBA, (i.e. to examine 
many streams of dissimilar information in one framework or decision matrix) 
so as to “evaluate and choose among alternatives based on multiple criteria 
using  systematic  analysis  that  overcomes  the  limitations  of  unstructured 
individual  or  group  decision  making”  (Kiker  et  al,  2005).    Some  of  the 
optimisation methods used within the MCDA framework include Multi Attribute 
Utility  (or  Value)  Theory,  the  Analytical  Hierarchy  Process  or  Outranking 
Models (Kiker et al, 2005).   
 
Decision trees may also be a useful technique to employ where uncertainty is 
an  issue,  however,  these  trees  are  often  highly  complex  and  difficult  to 
interpret  often  to  the  point  of  rendering  them  useless  in  a  policy  making   33 
environment (Quinlan, 1986).  An example of the use of decision trees with 
true  uncertainty  is  provided  by  Grant  and  Quiggin  (2006)  in  their  paper 
“Learning and Discovery” which examines uncertainties that can occur due to 
the  individual  researcher’s  unawareness  of  alternative  possibilities.    This 
‘unawareness’ can be realised either through direct observation or through 
consultation with colleagues, as opposed to gaining more data making the 
use  of  Bayesian  updating  redundant  when  dealing  with  awareness  of 
alternatives  (i.e.  there  is  a  sense  of  ambiguity  surrounding  the  new 
information) as opposed to hard or factual data which removes (some of) the 
uncertainty
37.   
3.2.6  The Bayesian Approach 
 
The traditional Bayesian approach treats the unknown parameters of a model 
as random variables. The decision maker then combines a pre-specified prior 
over the parameters with observations from the data to construct a predictive 
distribution of returns. Expected utility is then maximised with respect to the 
predictive  distribution  over  the  Bayesian  optimal  portfolios.    This  approach 
works well with respect to risk. 
 
However, the Bayesian decision maker is assumed to have only a single prior 
or, equivalently, to be neutral to true or radical uncertainty. Given the difficulty 
in estimating points of returns and the sensitivity of portfolio weights to the 
choice of a particular prior, and the substantial evidence from experiments 
that agents are not neutral to ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961). 
38 It is important to 
consider investors with multiple priors who are dealing with decisions under 
uncertainty (Garlappi et al, 2006). 
39, 
40 
                                                 
37 In Grant and Quiggin (2006), Aragones et al. (2005) notes that learning may be possible 
without new data, i.e. through informal nodes such as communication with a colleague.  This 
is directly in contrast with the Bayesian case under unbounded rationality where learning can 
only occur as a result of new data (p. 3-4). 
38 The aversion to ambiguity is particularly strong in cases where people feel that their 
competence in assessing the relevant probabilities is low (Heath and Tversky, 1991) and 
when subjects are told that there may be other people who are more qualified to evaluate a 
particular risky position (Fox and Tversky, 1995). 
 
39 For example, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Epstein and Wang (1994), and Chen and 
Epstein (2002), have developed models of decision making that allow for multiple priors 
where the decision-maker is not neutral to ambiguity.   34 
 
3.2.7  Real Options Analysis 
 
Real options are based on the idea that if, (relevant) information is available in 
the future that could lessen the uncertainty of the decision, then it is worth 
waiting for this information to become available. That is, if the policy decision 
is deferred now, then a ‘better’ decision could be made in the future. However, 
this delay can also come at a cost. Originating in the field of finance (Myers, 
1984)  the  concept  of  real  options  was  an  expansion  of  options  theory 
designed to focus on actual or real (tangible) decisions and to account for 
uncertainty about: 
 
(i)  The  future  evolution  of  knowledge  about  the  parameters  that 
determine the value of the project; 
(ii)  Management's  ability  to  respond  to  changes  in  estimating  these 
parameters.  
 
Within economics, the seminal work by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry 
(1974) applied the ‘option value’ concept to economic decision making under 
uncertainty. A (quasi-)
41 option value, due to arrival of new information, has 
five main attributes: 
 
•  Maintain the flexibility of responding to new information; 
•  Independent of risk attitude; 
•  Dynamic framework with learning. 
 
In environmental economics, real options have been extensively applied from 
Arrow  and  Fisher’s  original  paper  (1974)  to  evaluating  natural  resource 
investments  (Brennan  and  Schwartz,  1985),  Pindyck’s  (1991)  work  on 
                                                                                                                                            
40 It should be noted, that as with EU theory, there has been much work that attempts to 
account from true uncertainty within a Bayesian framework, but to date not one single method 
has provided a ‘solution’ that is widely accepted.  
41 The term ‘quasi’ option is sometimes applied when issues of irreversibility exist – see 
footnote 7 in Pindyck, 2007 for more details.   35 
irreversibilities, pollution emissions limits (Carr and Saphores,1999) and more 
recently in the area of climate change (Pindyck, 2002, 2007). 
 
From a managerial, or decision makers, perspective, the advantages of a real 
options analysis includes: 
 
•  Considers  uncertainties  and  the  options  (flexibilities)  giving  two 
responses: 
o  The value of the investment opportunity (value of the option) 
o  The optimal decision rule (threshold) 
•  Can  be  viewed  as  an  optimisation  problem,  maximising  net  present 
value (NPV) subject to: 
o  Market uncertainties (i.e. prices) 
o  Technical  uncertainties  (i.e.  volume  of  stock,  e.g.  numbers  of 
species etc) 
o  Relevant options (flexibilities) 
 
3.2.8  Other Dynamic Problems 
 
Uncertainty, the more complex of the two constructs, can be accounted for in 
an Optimal Control Theory framework.  Inter-temporal optimisation can either 
be done in discrete time (dynamic programming) or continuous time (optimal 
control theory); both can be solved analytically or numerically under certain 
conditions. 
 
There  are  many  suggestions  of  techniques  within  a  dynamic  programming 
framework  that  account  for  risk  and  uncertainty  and  these  techniques  are 
widely  used  in  agricultural,  fisheries  and  forestry  areas  as  well  as  in 
environmental applications (Kennedy, 1981). Risk can be accounted for with 
non-linear preferences or by endogenising risk within a model.  
 
Optimal  stopping  (or  timing)  (a  subset  of  Optimal  Control  Theory)  is 
concerned with choosing a point in time to take an action in order to maximise   36 
an expected return or minimise an expected cost. Optimal stopping problems 
can be found in areas of statistics, economics (Lippman and McCall, 1976) 
including  environmental  economics  (see  Mäler  and  Fisher,  2005;  Pindyck, 
2001 and Clarke and Reed, 1990) and mathematical finance (in relation to 
Options Theory).
42   
 
3.3  Limitations of learning and acquiring more information 
 
In situations of pure stochasticity there are times when ‘learning’ will not help 
and  when  uncertainty  does  not  change  with  the  availability  of  information. 
Sometimes the best decision has to be made based on the condition of the 
environment  at  that  specific  point  in  time,  with  that  being  the  maximum 
amount  of  information  that  will  ever  be  available  (Freeman  and  Zeitouni, 
2003). This occurs when: 
 
•  The complexity of the problem or the combination of processes is such 
that the environment cannot be better understood than it is currently; 
•  The level of uncertainty today is the same as the level of uncertainty 
previously or what it will be tomorrow. 
 
These issues can be overcome by either using stochastic variables in optimal 
stopping  models  (Freeman  and  Zeitouni,  2003),  or  by  implementing  two 
parallel  policies  that  balance  the  need  for  more/better  information  with  the 
need to avoid negative consequences (Manne and Richels, 1992). 
 
Section 4    Frameworks 
 
There are many possible solutions to addressing risk and uncertainty within 
an  environmental  economics  and  policy  setting.  Beyond  increased 
awareness, however, it is difficult to determine which ones are ‘best’ and for 
                                                 
42 There is a close theoretical relationship between Options Theory and Optimal Stopping 
(Fisher and Mäler, 2005 and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). For further information on these 
theories and their relationships see Rico-Ramirez and Diwekar, 2004 and Shastri and 
Diwekar, 2006.   37 
which situations and which ones are feasible both from a practical as well as a 
cost  issue  is  much  more  difficult.  This  section  provides  a  conceptual 
schematic  which  covers  most  of  the  key  points  outlined this  paper;  it  also 
presents a decision tree type schematic of guidelines to help to think through 
problems  and  suggests  specific  tools  that  may  be  used  throughout  the 
thought process/analysis. This section will also discuss possibilities for a case 
study, Section 5, to highlight how this framework and the guidelines can be 
practically applied.  
 
4.1  Framework 
 
The aim of the framework below, Figure 4.1, is to present a big picture view of 
the problems surrounding, and distinguishing between, risk and uncertainty 
across several dimensions: time (current versus future), degree of reversibility 
and  the  expert  versus  public  opinion  debate,  which  is  key  in  formulating 
effective policy communication. This framework also attempts to incorporate 
the ideas behind Adaptive Management and suggests that the Precautionary 
Principle  be  at  least  acknowledged  in  considerations  concerning  radical 
uncertainty and irreversibilities. 
   38 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Conceptual framework  
 
Figure 4.1 can be divided into three components: 
I.  Core component (blue): which accounts for the Adaptive Management 
type cycle where risks and hazards are assessed and managed.  This 
process of evaluation allows information to flow in and out of the system 
















CURRENT  FUTURE 
RISKS / HAZARDS 







Positive or mitigating effect 
Negative or exacerbating effect 
Iterative (and additive) process 
 
I:  Core 
II: The human component 
III: True uncertainty 
COMMUNICATION   39 
effective ways of dealing with the problem.  This core component may be 
similar  to  many  standard  risk  assessment  and  risk  management 
frameworks  which  are  currently  implemented  in  a  variety  of  different 
areas.  Note that this core component can be in a current or a future time 
frame, and assessments and management should take into account both 
of these states. 
II.  The  human  component  (yellow  –  dashed  line):  adds  a  psychological 
dimension  to  the  process  and  highlights  the  importance  of  human 
behaviour  in  deciding  how  to  choose  to  assess  (or  perceive)  and 
communicate risks and what they mean to different people (members of 
the public, policy makers, scientists/researchers). 
III.  True  Uncertainty  (pink  –  fine  dotted  line):    ties  in  the  issues  of 
irreversibility and ambiguity which may be able to be accounted for in the 
core component through concepts such as the Precautionary Principle. 
 
4.2  Guidelines 
 
The following guidelines have been adapted from the VCEC Report (2009) 
which focuses on “Getting Environmental Regulation Right”. The idea is to 
develop a set of guidelines (Figure 4.2 below) which arise logically from the 
previously discussed conceptual issues (see Figure 4.1 above). The colour 
coding in the below diagram suggests an interaction between figures 4.1 and 
4.2,  with  the  ‘core  component’  (blue)  and  ‘true  uncertainty’  (pink)  being 
directly  represented  in  both  figures.    The  ‘human  component’  apparent  in 
figure  4.1  should  be  seen  as  being  indirectly  related  to  figure  4.2,  in  that 
consideration of public reaction and decision makers’ individual risk attitudes 
should be taken throughout the process. 
 
This figure also shows an overview of possible tools that could be used at 
each stage of the decision making process (represented on the left hand side 
of the diagram 4.2). 




NO  YES 
NO 
YES 
Stage 1: Planning 
1. Understanding & defining the problem  
2. Assessing the availability of information  
3. What are the risk management options? 
 
Stage 3: Risk Assessment  
1. Risk assessment of the biophysical issues 
2. Risk assessment of the economic issues 
 
Stage 2: Defining Policy Objectives & Specifying Alternative 
Options 
1. What options are available? 
2. Describe possible outcomes 
 
Stage 4: Are there any ‘no-regrets’ options? 
 
Stage 7: Reducing Uncertainty 
1. Can further research add to the process?  
2. Will there be any new information? 
 What are the costs of this new info? 
 What are the costs of waiting? 
Stage 9: Decision 
1. What is the conservative choice? 
2. Is it consistent with current policy? 
Uncertainty does not 
matter take ‘no regrets’ 
option. 
Stage 5:  Can the 
uncertainty be defined? 
Stage 8: What is the worst case scenario? 
1.  Are there irreversibilities present? 
2. Should the Precautionary Principle or Safe Minimum 






Stage 10: Review, Evaluate, Adapt. 
1.  Can we improve on it? 
2.  Is there/does this evaluation provide new information? 
Stage 6: Can we afford to wait? 
YES   41 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Example guidelines  





This paper has defined the concepts of risk and uncertainty and examined the 
existing conceptual and practical frameworks available to account for risk and 
uncertainty within environmental economics. Further, a conceptual framework 
has been developed to account for the main issues raised in this paper and a 
set of ‘best practice’ guidelines has been has been designed to suggest a way 
in which to deal with risk and uncertainty in a policy framework. In summary, 
there does not appear to be a clear or a single ‘solution’ to the problem of 
uncertainty in a policy framework, essentially a holistic ‘adaptive management’ 
approach is needed and this should be taken ex-ante and ex-post in the policy 
process where possible.     42 
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